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Dynamic Observers for the Synthesis of Opaque Systems
Franck Cassez* , Je´re´my Dubreil** , Herve´ Marchand***
Abstract: In this paper, we address the problem of synthesizing opaque systems. A secret predicate S
over the runs of a system G is opaque to an external user having partial observability over G, if s/he can
never infer from the observation of a run of G that the run belongs to S. We first investigate the case of
static partial observability where the set of events the user can observe is fixed a priori. In this context,
we show that checking whether a system is opaque is PSPACE-complete, which implies that computing
an optimal static observer ensuring opacity is also a PSPACE-complete problem. Next, we introduce
dynamic partial observability where the set of events the user can observe changes over time. We show
how to check that a system is opaque w.r.t. to a dynamic observer and also address the corresponding
synthesis problem: given a system G and secret states S, compute the set of dynamic observers under
which S is opaque. Our main result is that the set of such observers can be finitely represented and can
be computed in EXPTIME.
Key-words: security, confidentiality property, opacity, synthesis, dynamic observation
Observateurs dynamiques pour la synthe`se de syste`mes opaques
Re´sume´ : Dans cette article, nous nous inte´ressons a` la synthe`se de syste`mes opaques. Un pre´dicat S
sur les exe´cutions d’un syste`me G est opaque vis a` vis d’un utilisateur, observant partiellement le syste`me,
si celui-ci ne peut jamais de´duire des traces observe´es que l’exe´cution courante appartient a` S. Dans un
premier temps, nous nous inte´ressons au cas ou` le sous-ensemble des e´ve´nements que l’attaquant peut
observer est fixe. Dans ce cadre, nous montrons que la ve´rification de l’opacite´ est PSPACE comple`te.
Dans un deuxie`me temps, nous introduisons la notion d’observation partielle dynamique qui traduit le
fait que l’ensemble des e´ve´nements que l’attaquant peut observer varie avec le temps. Nous montrons
comment ve´rifier l’opacite´ sur un syste`me vis a` vis d’un observateur dynamique et conside´rons e´galement
le proble`me de synthe`se associe´: e´tant donne´ un syste`me G et un secret S, calculer l’ensemble des
observateurs dynamiques pour lesquels S est opaque. Nous montrons ainsi que cet ensemble peut eˆtre
repre´sente´ de manie`re fini avec une complexite´ de calcul EXPTIME.
Mots cle´s : se´curite´, proprie´te´ de confidentialite´, opacite´, synthe`se, observation dynamique
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1 Introduction
Security is one of the most important and challenging aspects in designing services deployed on large
open networks like Internet or mobile phones. Some services like medical information storage, e-banking
or e-voting systems may deal with information that should not be corrupted or acquired by unauthorized
people. For such services, naturally subject to malicious attacks, methods to certify their security are
crucial. In this context there has been many research to develop formal methods for the design of secure
systems and a growing interest in the formal verification of security properties [16, 3, 12] and in their
model-based testing [20, 15, 6, 14, 10]. Security properties are generally divided into three categories:
integrity, availability and confidentiality. We focus here on confidentiality and especially information
flow properties. We use the notion of opacity introduced in [18] and later developed in [4] formalizing
the absence of information flow, or more precisely, the impossibility for an attacker to infer the truth
of a predicate (it could be the occurrence in the system of some particular sequences, or the fact that
the system is in some particular configurations). Consider a predicate ϕ over the runs of a system G
and an attacker observing only a subset of the events of G. We assume also that the attacker knows the
model G. The attacker should not be able to infer that a run of G belongs to ϕ. The secret ϕ is opaque
for G with respect to a given partial observation if for every run of G that belongs to ϕ, there exists
a run, observationally equivalent from the attacker’s point of view, that does not belong to ϕ. In such
case, the attacker can never be sure that a run of G satisfying ϕ has occurred. In the sequel, we shall
consider a secret ϕ corresponding to either a regular language or a set of secret states. Finally, note that
the definition of opacity is general enough to model other notions of information flow like trace-based
non-interference [11] and anonymity. The reductions are given in [4]. Note also that secrecy [1] can be
handled as a particular case of opacity (see Section 3) and thus our framework applies to secrecy as well.
Related Work. Methods for the synthesis of opaque systems have already been investigated from the
supervisory control point of view. In these frameworks, some of the events are uncontrollable and the set
of events an external attacker can observe is fixed. If the system is G, the approach is then to restrict G
(remove some of its behaviors) using a supervisor (or controller) C, in order to render a secret ϕ opaque
in the supervised system G/C. In [2], the authors consider several secrets and attackers with different
sets of observable events. They provide sufficient conditions to compute an optimal controller preserving
all secrets assuming that the controller has complete knowledge of the system and full control on it.
In [8, 9], the authors consider a control problem under partial observation and provide algorithms to
compute the optimal controller ensuring the opacity of one secret against one attacker. Other works on
the enforcement of opacity by means of controllers can be found in [22]. Note that these approaches are
intrusive in the sense that the system G has to be modified.
Our Contribution. In this paper, instead of restricting the behavior of the system by means of a
controller which enables/disables some actions, we consider dynamic observers that will dynamically
change the set of observable events in order to ensure opacity. Compared to the approaches related
to the supervisory control theory, this approach is not intrusive in the sense that it does not restrict
system’s behavior but only hide observable events. Indeed, one can think of a dynamic observer as a
monitor or filter (See Figure 1) which is added on top of the system.
System G Filter D Attacker Uu ∈ Σ
∗ D(u)
Figure 1: Architecture Filtering out Sequences of Events in G
The main contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we extend the notion of opacity for static
observers (i.e., the natural projection) to dynamic observers.1 We show how to check opacity when the
dynamic observer is given by a finite automaton. Second we give an algorithm to compute the set of all
dynamic observers which can ensure opacity of a secret ϕ for a given system G. In particular, we show
1 At this point, it should be mentioned that we assume the attacker has not only a perfect knowledge of the system but
also of the observer.
2
that this problem can be reduced to a safety 2-player game problem. Intuitively, the first player will play
the role of an observer and decide which subset of event should remain observable after a given trace
and Player 2 will play the role of both the system and the attacker and will decide what will be the next
observable event amongst the ones Player 1 has last chosen to render observable. The goal of Player 2 is
thus to make the system evolve in states in which the attacker is sure that the secret is revealed, whereas
the goal of Player 1 is opposite (he has to choose the successive sequences of observable events’ sets so
that the secret is never revealed). In particular, we show that the set of valid observers (the ones which
ensure opacity) can be finitely represented. Finally we consider an optimization problem which is to
compute a least expensive observer which ensures opacity. Notice also that secrecy (see section 3) can
be handled as a particular case of opacity and thus our framework applies to secrecy as well. Finally,
the notion of dynamic observers was already introduced in [5] for the fault diagnosis problem. Notice
that the fault diagnosis problem and the opacity problems are not reducible one to the other and thus
we have to design new algorithms to solve the opacity problems under dynamic observations.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2 we introduce some notations for words, languages and
finite automata. In Section 3 we define the notion of opacity and show that deciding opacity for finite
automata is PSPACE-complete. We also consider an optimization problem of computing a largest set of
observable events to ensure opacity and show that this problem is PSPACE-complete as well. Section 4
considers dynamic observers for ensuring opacity. We prove that the set of all observers that ensure
opacity can be computed in EXPTIME. In Section 5 we define a notion of cost for observers and give an
algorithm to compute a least expensive dynamic observer which ensures opacity.
2 Notation & preliminaries
Let Σ be a finite alphabet. Σ∗ is the set of finite words over Σ and contains the empty word ε. A
language L is any subset of Σ∗. Given two words u ∈ Σ∗ and u′ ∈ Σ∗ we denote u.u′ the concatenation
of u and u′ which is defined in the usual way. |u| stands for the length of the word u (the length of the
empty word is zero). We let Σn with n ∈ N denote the words of length n over Σ.
Given Σ1 ⊆ Σ, we define the projection operator on finite words, PΣ1 : Σ∗ → Σ∗1 , that removes in a
sequence of Σ∗ all the events that do not belong to Σ1. Formally, PΣ1 is recursively defined as follows:
PΣ1(ε) = ε and for λ ∈ Σ, u ∈ Σ∗, PΣ1(u.λ) = PΣ1(u).λ if λ ∈ Σ1 and PΣ1(u) otherwise. Let K ⊆ Σ∗ be
a language. The definition of projection for words extends to languages: PΣ1(K) = {PΣ1(u) | u ∈ K}.
Conversely, let K ⊆ Σ∗1. The inverse projection of K is P−1Σ1 (K) = {u ∈ Σ∗ | PΣ1(u) ∈ K}.
Definition 1 (Automaton) An automaton G is a tuple (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ) with Q a set of states, q0 ∈ Q
is the initial state, δ : Q × Σ → 2Q is the transition relation and F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
If Q is finite, G is a finite automaton (FA). 
For q ∈ Q, Enabled(q) is the set of actions enabled at q, i.e., the set of λ such that δ(q, λ) 6= ∅. We write
q
λ−−→ whenever λ ∈ Enabled(q). An automaton is complete if for each λ ∈ Σ and each q ∈ Q, q λ−−→.
The automaton A is deterministic if for all q ∈ Q and all λ ∈ Σ, |δ(q, λ)| ≤ 1. A run ρ from state q0 in
G is a finite sequence of transitions
q0
λ1−−→ q1 λ2−−→ q2 · · · qi−1 λi−−→ qi · · · qn−1 λn−−→ qn (1)
s.t. λi+1 ∈ Σ and qi+1 ∈ δ(qi, λi+1) for i ≥ 0. The trace of the run ρ is tr(ρ) = λ1.λ2 · · ·λn. We let
last(ρ) = qn, and the length of ρ, denoted |ρ|, is n. For i ≤ n we denote by ρ(i) the prefix of the run ρ
truncated at state qi, i.e., ρ(i) = q0
λ1−−→ q1 · · · qi−1 λi−−→ qi. The set of finite runs from q0 in G is denoted
Runs(G).
A word u ∈ Σ∗ is generated by G if u = tr(ρ) for some ρ ∈ Runs(G). Let L(G) be the set of words
generated by G. The word u ∈ Σ∗ is accepted by G if u = tr(ρ) for some ρ ∈ Runs(G) with last(ρ) ∈ F .
The language of (finite) words LF (G) of G is the set of words accepted by G. If G is a FA such that
F = Q we simply omit F in the tuple that defines G.
In the sequel we will use the Post operator defined as follows: let X ⊆ Q, Post(X, ε) = X and for
u ∈ Σ∗, λ ∈ Σ,Post(X,u.λ) = ∪q∈Post(X,u)δ(q, λ). We also let Post(X,L) = ∪u∈LPost(X,u) for a non
empty language L.
3
Product of Automata. The product of automata is defined in the usual way: the product automaton
represents the concurrent behavior of the automata with synchronization on the common events.
Definition 2 (Product of Automata) Let A1 = (Q1, q10 ,Σ1, δ1, F1) and A2 = (Q2, q
2
0 ,Σ2, δ2, F2).
The product of A1 and A2 is the automaton A1 ×A2 = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ) where:
• Q = Q1 ×Q2, F = F1 × F2
• q0 = (q10 , q20),
• Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2,
• δ : Q× Σ→ 2Q is defined by:
(q1, q2), λ 7→
 δ1(q1, λ)× δ2(q2, λ) if λ ∈ Σ1 ∩ Σ2δ1(q1, λ)× {q2} if λ ∈ Σ1 \ Σ2{q1} × δ2(q2, λ) if λ ∈ Σ2 \ Σ1

3 Opacity with Static Projections
Enforcing opacity aims at preventing an attacker, denoted U , from deducing confidential information on
the execution of a system G from the observation of a subset of events Σo ⊆ Σ. Given a run of G with
trace s, the observation of the attacker U is given by the static natural projection PΣo(s) following the
architecture of Figure 1 with D(u) = PΣo(u).
In the sequel we let G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ) be a non-deterministic finite automaton over Σ. The language
Lϕ ⊆ Σ∗ represents a confidential information on the execution of G, i.e. if the current trace of a run
is u ∈ L(G), the user should not be able to deduce, from the knowledge of PΣo(s) and the structure of
G, that u ∈ Lϕ. As stressed earlier, the attacker is armed with full information on the structure of G
(he can perform computations using G like subset constructions) but has only partial observability at
runtime upon its behaviors, namely the observed traces are in Σ∗o.
Let Σo ⊆ Σ. The set of Σo-traces of G is TrΣo(G) = PΣo(L(G)). We define the operator [[·]]Σo by:
[[ε]]Σo = {ε} and for µ ∈ Σ∗o and λ ∈ Σo, [[µ.λ]]Σo = P−1Σ (µ).λ ∩ L(G)
i.e., u ∈ [[µ.λ]]Σo iff (1) the projection of u is µ.λ and (2) u ∈ L(G) and (3) u ends with an observable
“λ” event.
Remark 1 The above semantics is consistent with an on-line observation performed by a user of the
system for whom the system is only seen through the interface given by the observation mask PΣo . We
suppose that users are reacting faster than the system. Therefore, when an observable event occurs, a
user can take a decision before the system proceeds with any unobservable event. This explains why we
do not consider trajectories ending with unobservable events in the definition of the semantics. 
Next we introduce the notion of opacity first defined in [18, 4]. Intuitively, a secret Lϕ is said to be
opaque with respect to a pair (G,Σo) if the attacker U can never be sure that the current trace of the
run in G is in Lϕ.
Definition 3 (Trace Based Opacity) Let Lϕ ⊆ Σ∗. The secret Lϕ is opaque with respect to (G,Σo)
if for all µ ∈ TrΣo(G), [[µ]]Σo 6⊆ Lϕ. 
Remark 2 Notice that [[µ]]Σo is never empty when µ ∈ TrΣo(G).
Example 1 Let G be the automaton depicted in Figure 2 with Σ = {h, p, a, b}, Σo = {a, b}. The secret
under consideration is the occurrence of the event “h”, and this can defined by Lϕ = Σ∗.h.Σ∗. This
should not be revealed to the users of the system, knowing that “h” is not observable. Lϕ is not opaque
w.r.t. (G,Σo) as by observing “b”, the sole corresponding sequence in [[b]]Σo is h.b and thus it is in Lϕ.
Note that if the attacker observes only “a”, then it cannot tell whether the current sequence of actions
of the system belongs to Lϕ as [[a]]Σo = {p.a, h.a} and thus is not included in Lϕ. 
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Figure 2: Trace based opacity illustration
An alternative definition of opacity is when the secret is a set of states of the system.
Definition 4 (State Based Opacity) Let F ⊆ Q. The secret F is opaque with respect to (G,Σo) if
for all µ ∈ TrΣo(G), Post({q0}, [[µ]]Σo) 6⊆ F. 
We can extend the definition of opacity to a (finite) family of sets F = {F1, F2, · · · , Fk}: the secret F is
opaque with respect to (G,Σo) if for all F ∈ F , for all µ ∈ TrΣo(G), Post({q0}, [[µ]]Σo) 6⊆ F. This can
be used to express other kinds of confidentiality properties. For example, [1] introduced the notion of
secrecy of a set of states F . Intuitively, F is not secret w.r.t. G and Σo whenever after an observation
µ, the attacker either knows that the system is in F or knows that it is not in F . Secrecy can thus be
handled considering the opacity w.r.t. a family {F,Q \ F}. In the sequel we consider only one set of
states F and, when necessary, we point out what has to be done for solving the problems with family of
sets.
Example 2 Consider the automaton G of Figure 3, with Σo = Σ = {a, b}. The secret is given by the
states represented by red squares ) i.e., F = {q2, q5}.
q0 q1 q2 q3
q4 q5 q6
b
a
a
b a
a,b
b
a
b
a,b
Figure 3: State based opacity illustration
The secret F is certainly not state-based opaque with respect to (G,Σ), as by observing a trace of b∗.a.b,
an attacker U knows that the system is in a secret state. Notice that he does not know whether it is q2
or q5 but still he knows that the state of the system is in F . 
3.1 From Trace Based to State Based Opacity
Let Lϕ be given by a finite and complete automaton Aϕ with accepting states Qϕ and initial state q
ϕ
0 .
Define G×Aϕ with accepting states Fϕ = Q×Qϕ.
Proposition 1 If Aϕ is deterministic then Lϕ is trace based opaque w.r.t. (G,Σo) iff Fϕ is State Based
opaque w.r.t. (G×Aϕ,Σo).
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of Definitions 3, 4 and 2. Let (q0, q
ϕ
0 ) be the initial state
of G × Aϕ. We have s ∈ L(G) ∩ Lϕ ⇔ s ∈ LFϕ(G × Aϕ) and Since Aϕ is deterministic, this is
equivalent to Post({(q0, qϕ0 )}, [[µ]]Σo) ⊆ Fϕ. Consequently for all µ ∈ TrΣo(G), [[µ]]Σo ⊆ Lϕ ⇐⇒
Post({(q0, qϕ0 )}, [[µ]]Σo) ⊆ Fϕ. 
Hence in this case, Trace Based Opacity can be reduced in polynomial time to State Based Opacity. If
Aϕ is non-deterministic, prior to the previous construction we need to determinize Aϕ and the product
has size exponential in |Aϕ|.
In the sequel we shall focus on variations of the State Based Opacity problem:
5
Problem 1 (Static State Based Opacity Problem)
Input: A non-deterministic FA G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ) and Σo ⊆ Σ.
Problem: Is F opaque w.r.t. (G,Σo) ?
3.2 Checking State Based Opacity
Let G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ) be a non-deterministic finite automaton with F the secret states. In order to
check for the opacity of F w.r.t. (G,Σo), we first introduce the classical notion of determinization via
subset construction adapted to our definition of opacity: Deto(G) denotes the deterministic automaton
which is computed from G. Formally, it can be obtained as follows:
Definition 5 Let G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ) then Deto(G) = (X , X0,Σo,∆, Fo) where:
• X ⊆ 2Q \ ∅ and X0 = {q0} and Fo = 2F ,
• given λ ∈ Σo, if X ′ = Post(X, (Σ \ Σo)∗.λ) 6= ∅ then ∆(X,λ) = X ′. 
Now, based on this operation, to check whether F is opaque w.r.t. (G,Σo) we can proceed as follows:
1. determinize G using the construction of Definition 5 and denote Deto(G) the obtained automaton
with states in 2Q. Note that the set of accepting states is Fo = 2F ;
2. check whether Fo is reachable in Deto(G)
• if yes, then F is not opaque w.r.t. (G,Σo),
• otherwise, F is opaque w.r.t. (G,Σo).
Indeed, if there exists µ ∈ Σ∗o such that µ ∈ LFo(Deto(G)), then according to Definition 5, it entails that
Post({q0}, [[µ]]Σo) ⊆ F , meaning that F is not opaque w.r.t. (G,Σo). Thus, according to this construction,
the set of observed traces for which the attacker knows that the current execution discloses the secret is
given by LFo(Deto(G)) where Fo = 2
F .
To check opacity for a family {F1, F2, · · · , Fk}, we define F to be the set 2F1 ∪ 2F2 ∪ · · · ∪ 2Fk (as
pointed out before, this enables us to handle secrecy).
The previous construction shows that State Based Opacity on non-deterministic FA can be checked in
exponential time. Actually, checking state based opacity for (non-deterministic) FA is PSPACE-complete.
First, from [21], checking language universality for a non-deterministic FA is PSPACE-complete. Given a
FA G over Σ and F the set of accepting states, the (language) universality problem is to decide whether G
accepts all possible sequences, namely if LF (G) = Σ∗. If not, then G is not universal. From [21], checking
language universality for a non-deterministic FA is PSPACE-complete. To show that the state based
opacity problem is PSPACE-complete, we prove that state based opacity is equivalent to universality.
Theorem 1 Problem 1 is PSPACE-complete for non-deterministic FA.
Proof. Let G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ) be a non-deterministic finite automaton with accepting states in F . We
assume that G is complete i.e., L(G) = Σ∗. Note that in this case [[w]]Σ = w.
G is not language universal ⇐⇒ ∃w ∈ Σ∗s.t. Post({q0}, [[w]]Σ) ⊆ Q \ F
With the definition of state based opacity, taking Σo = Σ,
Q \ F is not opaque w.r.t. (G,Σ) ⇐⇒ ∃µ ∈ Σ∗s.t. Post({q0}, [[µ]]Σ) ⊆ Q \ F
Hence LF (G) = Σ∗ iff Q \ F is opaque w.r.t. (G,Σ) and opacity if PSPACE-complete. 
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3.3 Maximum Cardinality Set for Static Projections
If a secret is opaque w.r.t. to a set of observable events Σo, it will still be opaque w.r.t. any subset of
Σo (the less you observe, the less accurate you are). It might be of interest to hide as few events as
possible from the attacker still preserving opacity of a secret. Indeed, hiding an event can be seen as
energy consuming or as limiting the interactions or visibility for users of the system (and some of them
are not malicious attackers) and thus should be avoided if unnecessary.
Assume the secret is opaque w.r.t. Σo = ∅. This suggests an optimization problem which can be
formulated as follows: What is the maximum cardinality of the sets of observable events Σo such that
the secret is opaque ? More precisely, we can state the following optimization problem:
Problem 2 (Maximum Number of Observable Events)
Input: A non-deterministic FA G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ), n ∈ N s.t. n ≤ |Σ|.
Problems:
(A) Is there any Σo ⊆ Σ with |Σo| = n, such that F is opaque w.r.t. (G,Σo) ?
(B) If the answer to (A) is “yes”, find the maximum n0 such that there exists Σo ⊆ Σ
with |Σo| = n0 and F is opaque w.r.t. (G,Σo).
Theorem 2 Problem 2.(A) and Problem 2.(B) are PSPACE-complete.
Proof. PSPACE-easiness follows directly as we can guess a set Σo with |Σo| = n and check in PSPACE
whether F is opaque w.r.t. (G,Σo). Thus Problem 2.(A) is in NPSPACE and thus in PSPACE.
PSPACE-hardness is also easy because taking n = |Σ| amounts to checking that F is opaque
w.r.t. (G,Σ) which has been shown equivalent to the universality problem (proof of Theorem 1).
To solve Problem 2.(B) it suffices to iterate a binary search and thus Problem 2.(B) is also in PSPACE. To
see it is PSPACE-complete, to check whether F is opaque w.r.t. (G,Σ), it suffices to solve Problem 2.(B)
and then check whether n0 = |Σ|. 
4 Opacity with Dynamic Projection
So far, we have assumed that the observability of events is given a priori and this is why we used the
term static projections/observers. We generalize this approach by considering the notion of dynamic
projections encoded by means of dynamic observers as introduced in [5] for the fault diagnosis problem.
In this section, we formulate the opacity problem using dynamic observers. Notice that the fault diagnosis
problem and the opacity problems are not reducible one to the other and thus we have to design new ad
hoc algorithms to solve the opacity problems under dynamic observations.
Next we introduce the notion of dynamic projection that permits to render unobservable some events
after a given observed trace (for example, some outputs of the system). To illustrate the benefits of such
projections, we consider the following example:
Example 3 Consider again the automaton G of Example 2, Figure 3, where the set of secret states is
F = {q2, q5}. With Σo = Σ = {a, b}, F is not opaque.
If either Σo = {a} or Σo = {b}, then the secret becomes opaque. Thus if we have to define static
sets of observable events, at least one event will have to be permanently unobservable. However, the less
you hide, the more important is the observable behavior of the system. Thus, we should try to reduce
as much as possible the hiding of events. For this particular example, we can be more efficient by using
a dynamic observer that will render unobservable an event only when necessary. In this example, after
observing b∗, the attacker still knows that the system is in the initial state. However, if a subsequent “a”
follows, then the attacker should not be able to observe “b” as in this case it could know the system is in
a secret state. We can then design a dynamic events’s hider as follows: at the beginning, everything is
observable; when an “a” occurs, the observer hides any subsequent “b” occurrences and permits only the
observation of “a”. Once an “a” has been observed, the observer releases its hiding by letting both “a”
and “b” be observable again. 
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4.1 Opacity Generalized to Dynamic Projection
In this section, we define the notion of dynamic projection and its associated dynamic observer. We
show how to extend the notion of opacity in order to take into account the dynamic aspect of events’
observability.
4.1.1 Dynamic projections and dynamic observers
An (observation-based) dynamic projection is a function that will decide to let an event be observable or
to hide it (see Figure 1), thus playing the role of a filter between the system and the attacker to prevent
information flow. Such a projection can be defined as follows:
Definition 6 A dynamic observability choice is a mapping TD : Σ∗ → 2Σ. The (observation-based)
dynamic projection induced by TD is the mapping D : Σ∗ → Σ∗ defined by: D(ε) = ε and for all u ∈ Σ∗,
and all λ ∈ Σ,
D(u.λ) = D(u).λ if λ ∈ TD(D(u)) and D(u.λ) = D(u) otherwise. (2)
Assuming that u ∈ Σ∗ occurred in the system and µ ∈ Σ∗ has been observed so far by the attacker
i.e., µ = D(u), then the events that are currently observable are the ones which belong to TD(µ). Note
that the choice of this set cannot change until an observable event occurs in the system. Given µ ∈ Σ∗,
D−1(µ) = {u ∈ Σ∗ | D(u) = µ} i.e., the set of sequences that project onto µ.
Example 4 A dynamic projection D : Σ∗ → Σ∗ corresponding to the one we introduced in Example 3 can
induced by the dynamic observability choice TD defined by ∀u ∈ b∗.a, TD(u) = {a}, and TD(u) = {a, b}
for all the other sequences u ∈ Σ∗. 
For a model G as above and a dynamic projection D, we denote by TrD(G) = D(L(G)), the set of
observed traces. Conversely, given µ ∈ TrD(G), the set of words [[µ]]D of G that are compatible with µ
is defined by:
[[ε]]D = {ε} and for µ ∈ Σ∗, λ ∈ Σ : [[µ.λ]]D = D−1(µ).λ ∩ L(G)
Given two different dynamic projections D1 and D2 and a system G over Σ, we say that D1 and D2 are
G-equivalent, denoted D1 ∼G D2, whenever for all u ∈ L(G), D1(u) = D2(u). The relation ∼G identifies
two dynamic projections when they agree on L(G); they can disagree on other words in Σ∗ but since
they will not be generated by G, it will not make any difference from the attacker point of view. In the
sequel we will be interested in computing the interesting part of dynamic projections given G, and thus
will compute one dynamic projection in each class.
4.1.2 Opacity with dynamic projection.
As in the previous section, we assume that the user is considered as an attacker, U , who is armed for this
with full information on the structure of G and knows D. Based on these assumptions, we generalize
Definition 4 by taking into account the new observation interface given by D.
Definition 7 Given a FA G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ), F is opaque with respect to (G,D) if
∀µ ∈ TrD(G), Post({q0}, [[µ]]D) 6⊆ F (3)

Again, this definition extends to family of sets. We say that D is a valid dynamic projection if (3)
is satisfied (i.e., whenever F is opaque w.r.t. (G,D)) and we denote by D the set of valid dynamic
projections. Obviously if D1 ∼G D2, then D1 is valid if and only if D2 is valid. We denote by D∼G the
quotient set of D by ∼G.
Remark 3 Let Σo ⊆ Σ be a fixed subset of actions, then if D is a dynamic projection that defines
a constant mapping making actions in Σo always observable (and the others always unobservable), we
have D(µ) = PΣo(µ) and we retrieve the original definition of state based opacity in case of static
projection. Finally, note that we can also alternatively consider a trace-based opacity as the one defined
in Definition 3, with dynamic projection instead of natural projection with a result similar to the one of
Proposition 1. The property of secrecy can be extended as well using dynamic projection. 
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In the sequel, we will be interested in checking the opacity of F w.r.t. (G,D) or to synthesize such
a dynamic projection D ensuring this property. In Section 3, the dynamic projection was merely the
natural projection and computing the observational behavior of G was easy. Here, we need to find a
characterization of these dynamic projections that can be used to check opacity or to enforce it. To do
so, we introduce the notion of dynamic observer [5] that will encode a dynamic projection in terms of
automata.
Definition 8 (Dynamic observer) An observer is a complete deterministic labeled automaton O =
(X,x0,Σ, δo,Γ) where X is a (possibly infinite) set of states, x0 ∈ X is the initial state, Σ is the set of
input events, δo : X × Σ→ X is the transition function (a total function), and Γ : X → 2Σ is a labeling
function that specifies the set of events that the observer keeps observable at state x. We require that for
all x ∈ X and for all λ ∈ Σ, if λ /∈ Γ(x), then δo(x, λ) = x, i.e., if the observer does not want an event
to be observed, it does not change its state when such an event occurs. 
We extend δo to words of Σ∗ by: δo(q, ε) = q and for u ∈ Σ∗, λ ∈ Σ, δo(q, u.λ) = δo(δo(q, u), λ). Assuming
that the observer is at state x and an event λ occurs, it outputs λ whenever λ ∈ Γ(x) or nothing (ε) if
λ /∈ Γ(x) and moves to state δo(x, λ). An observer can be interpreted as a functional transducer taking
a string u ∈ Σ∗ as input, and producing the output which corresponds to the successive events it has
chosen to keep observable.
Example 5 Examples of dynamic observers are given in Figure 4. 
1
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Γ(2) = {b}
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Γ(3) = {a}
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Figure 4: Examples of Dynamic Observers
We now relate the notion of dynamic observer to the notion of dynamic projection.
Proposition 2 Let O = (X,x0,Σ, δo,Γ) be an observer and define DO as follows: DO(ε) = ε, and
for all u ∈ Σ∗, DO(u.λ) = DO(u).λ if λ ∈ Γ(δo(x0, u)) and DO(u) otherwise. Then DO is a dynamic
projection.
Proof. To prove that DO defined above is a dynamic projection, it is sufficient to exhibit a dynamic
observability choice T : Σ∗ → 2Σ and to show that (2) holds. Let T (u) = Γ(δo(xo, DO(u))). It is easy
to show by induction that δo(xo, u) = δo(xo, DO(u)) because δo(x, λ) = x when λ /∈ Γ(x). We can then
define T (u) = Γ(δo(xo, u)) and the result follows from this remark. 
In the sequel, we shall write [[µ]]O for [[µ]]DO .
Proposition 3 Given a dynamic projection D and TD its dynamic observability choice, consider OD =
(Σ∗, ε,Σ, δD, TD) where δD(u, λ) = D(u.λ). Then OD is a dynamic observer.
Proof. OD is complete and deterministic by construction and after a sequence s if D(u.λ) = D(u) then
δD(u, λ) = u. 
Note that there might exists several equivalent observers that encode the same dynamic projection.
For example, the observer depicted in Figure 4(b) is one observer that encodes the dynamic projection
described in Example 4. But, one can consider other observers obtained by unfolding an arbitrary
number of time the self-loops in states 1 or 3.Finally, to mimic the language theory terminology, we will
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say that a dynamic projection D is regular whenever there exists a finite state dynamic observer O such
that DO = D.
To summarize this part, we can state that with each dynamic projection D, we can associate a dynamic
observer OD such that D = DOD . In other words, we can consider a dynamic projection or one of its
associated dynamic observers whenever one representation is more convenient than the other. If the
dynamic projection D derived from O is valid, we say that O is a valid dynamic observer. In that
case, we will say that F is opaque w.r.t. (G,O) and we denote by OBS(G) the set of all valid dynamic
observers.
4.1.3 Checking opacity
The first problem we are going to address consists in checking whether a given dynamic projection ensures
opacity. To do so, we assume given a dynamic observer which defines this projection map. The problem,
we are interested in, is then the following:
Problem 3 (Dynamic State Based Opacity Problem)
Input: A non-deterministic FA G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ) and a dynamic
observer O = (X,x0,Σ, δo,Γ).
Problem: Is F opaque w.r.t. (G,O) ?
We first construct an automaton which represents what an attacker will see under the dynamic choices
of observable events made by O (i.e. by hiding in G the events the observer have chosen to hide after
observing a given trace). To do so, we define the automaton G⊗O = (Q×X, (q0, x0),Σ∪{τ}, δ, F ×X)
where τ is a fresh letter not in Σ and δ is defined for each λ ∈ Σ, and (q, x) ∈ Q×X by:
• δ((q, x), λ) = δG(q, λ)× {δo(x, λ)} if λ ∈ Γ(x);
• δ((q, x), τ) = (∪λ∈Σ\Γ(x)δG(q, λ))× {x}.
Proposition 4 F is opaque w.r.t. (G,O) if and only if F ×X is opaque w.r.t. to (G⊗O,Σ).
Proof. Let µ ∈ TrO(G) be a trace observed by the attacker. We prove the following by induction on the
length of µ:
q ∈ PostG({q0}, [[µ]]O) ⇐⇒ (q, x) ∈ PostG⊗O({(q0, x0)}, [[µ]]Σ) for some x ∈ X.
If µ = ε, the result is immediate. Assume now that µ′ = µ.λ. Let q ∈ PostG({q0}, [[µ′]]O). By definition
of [[µ′]]O we have
q0
u−−→ q′ v−−→ q′′ λ−−→ q
with u ∈ [[µ]]O, u.v.λ ∈ [[µ.λ]]O. By induction hypothesis, it follows that the state (q′, δo(x0, u)) ∈
PostG⊗O({(q0, x0)}, [[µ]]Σ) where δo(x0, u) is the (unique) state of O after reading u. Then, there exists
a word w ∈ (Σ ∪ {τ})∗ such that PΣ(w) = µ and (q0, x0) w−−→(q′, δo(x0, u)) is a run of G ⊗ O. Assume
v = v1.v2. · · · .vk, k ≥ 0. As O(u.v) = O(u) , we must have vi 6∈ Γ(δo(x0, u.v1. · · · .vi)) when 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Hence, by construction of G⊗O, there is a sequence of transitions in G⊗O of the form
(q′, δo(x0, u))
τ−−→ δo(x0, u.v1) τ−−→ · · · τ−−→ (q′′, δo(x0, u.v))
with λ ∈ Γ(δo(x0, u.v)). Thus, (q0, x0) w−−→(q′, δo(x0, u)) τ
k.λ−−−−→(q, δo(u.v.λ)) is a run of G ⊗ O with
PΣ(w.τk.λ) = µ.λ = µ′. So, (q, δo(x0, u.v.λ)) ∈ PostG⊗O({(q0, x0)}, [[µ′]]Σ). The converse is also easy to
establish: if we have a sequence of τ transitions in G ⊗ O, they come from actions in G which are not
observable and this completes the proof. 
The previous result is general, and if O is a finite state observer we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3 For finite state observers, Problem 3 is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. As the size of the product G⊗O is the product of the size of G and the size of O and State Based
Opacity can be checked in PSPACE, PSPACE-easiness follows. Moreover, checking state based opacity
with respect to (G,Σ) can de done using a simple observer with one state which always let Σ observable
and PSPACE-hardness follows. 
As Proposition 4 reduces the problem of checking opacity with dynamic observers to the problem of
checking opacity with static observers, Theorem 3 extends to family of sets (and thus to secrecy).
10
4.2 Enforcing opacity with dynamic projections
So far, we have assumed that the dynamic projection/observer was given. Next we will be interested
in synthesizing one in such a way that the secret becomes opaque w.r.t. the system and this observer.
Initially we assume that the attacker can observe all events in Σ. The problem we have in mind is to
add an interface (a dynamic observer/projection) between the system and the attacker that will filter
out some events so that the confidential information never leaks following the architecture of Figure 1.
Thus the problem can be stated as follows:
Problem 4 (Dynamic Observer Synthesis Problem)
Input: A non-deterministic FA G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ).
Problem: Compute the set of valid observers OBS(G)2.
Deciding the existence of a valid observer is trivial: it is sufficient to check whether always hiding Σ is
a solution. Moreover, note that OBS(G) can be infinite and that there might be an infinite number of
different valid projections/observers ensuring the opacity of F with respect to G.
To solve Problem 4, we reduce it to a safety 2-player game. Player 1 will play the role of an observer
and Player 2 what the attacker observes. Assume the automaton G can be in any of the states s =
{q1, q2, · · · , qn}, after a sequence of actions occurred. A round of the game is: given s, Player 1 chooses
which letters should be observable next i.e., a set t ⊆ Σ; then it hands it over to Player 2 who picks up
an observable letter λ ∈ t; this determines a new set of states G can be in after λ, and the turn is back
to Player 1. The goal of the Players are defined by:
• The goal of Player 2 is to pick up a sequence of letters such that the set of states that can be
reached after this sequence is included in F . If Player 2 can do this, then it can infer the secret
F . Player 2 thus plays a reachability game trying to enforce a particular set of states, say Bad
(i.e., the states in which the secret is disclosed).
• The goal of Player 1 is opposite: it must keep the game in a safe set of states where the secret is
not disclosed. Thus Player 1 plays a safety game trying to keep the game in the complement set
of Bad.
As we are playing a (finite) turn-based game, Player 2 has a strategy to enforce Bad iff Player 1 has no
strategy to keep the game in the complement set of Bad (turn-based finite games are determined [17]).
We now formally defines the 2-player game and show it allows us to obtain a finite representation of all
the valid dynamic observers. Let H = (S1 ∪ S2, s0,M1 ∪M2, δH) be a deterministic game automaton
given by:
• S1 = 2Q is the set of Player 1 states and S2 = 2Q × 2Σ the set of Player 2 states;
• the initial state of the game is the Player 1 state s0 = {q0};
• Player 1 will choose a set of events to hide in Σ. Thus, Player 1 actions are in the alphabetM1 = 2Σ
and Player 2 actions in M2 = Σ;
• the transition relation δH ⊆ (S1 ×M1 × S2) ∪ (S2 ×M2 × S1) is given by:
– Player 1 moves (choice of events to observe): if s ∈ S1, t ⊆ Σ, then δH(s, t) = (s, t);
– Player 2 moves (choice of next observable event): if (s, t) ∈ S2, λ ∈ t and s′ = Post(s, (Σ \
t)∗.λ) 6= ∅, then δH((s, t), λ) = s′.
We define the set of Bad states to be the set of Player 1 states s s.t. s ⊆ F . For family of sets
F1, F2, · · · , Fk, Bad is the set of states 2F1 ∪ 2F2 ∪ · · · ∪ 2Fk .
Remark 4 If we want to exclude the possibility of hiding everything for Player 1, it suffices to build
the game H with this constraint on Player 1 moves (i.e., ∀s ∈ S1, Enabled(s) 6= ∅). Using a similar
method, we can also consider other kinds of constraints: for example, a valid observer could choose to
hide outputs whenever it is necessary to preserve the secret, however, this observer must keep observable
(and thus accepted) all the requests sent by the attacker to the system. To do so, assuming that Σ is
partitioned into Σ?∪Σ!, where Σ? denotes the set of inputs of the system and Σ! the set of outputs events,
we can force the observer to choose to hide only events of Σ!, letting observable all the actions performed
by the attacker by building the game H so that ∀s ∈ S1, 2Σ? ⊆ Enabled(s). 
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Let Runsi(H), i = 1, 2 be the set of runs of H that end in a Player i state. A strategy for Player i is
a mapping fi : Runsi(H) → Mi that associates with each run that ends in a Player i state, the new
choice of Player i. Given two strategies f1, f2, the game H generates the set of runs Outcome(f1, f2,H)
combining the choices of Players 1 and 2 w.r.t. f1 and f2. f1 is a winning strategy for Playing 1 in H
for avoiding Bad if for all Player 2 strategies f2, no run of Outcome(f1, f2,H) contains a Bad state.
A winning strategy for Player 2 is a strategy f2 s.t. for all strategy f1 of Player 1, Outcome(f1, f2,H)
reaches a Bad state. As turn-based games are determined, either Player 1 has a winning strategy or
Player 2 has a winning strategy.
We now relate the set of winning strategies for Player 1 in H to the set of valid dynamic projections.
Let PM2(%) = PΣ(tr(%)) for a run % of H.
Definition 9 Given a dynamic projection D, we define a strategy fD such that for every % ∈ Runs1(H),
fD(%) = TD(PM2(%)). 
Let Outcome1(f1,H) = (∪f2Outcome(f1, f2,H))∩Runs1(H) be the set of runs ending in a Player 1 state
which can be generated in the game when Player 1 plays f1 against all the possible strategies of Player 2.
The set of runs Outcome2(f2,H) is similarly defined.
Lemma 1 Let D be a dynamic projection. If % ∈ Outcome1(fD,H) and µ = PM2(tr(%)), then µ ∈
TrD(G) and last(%) = PostG(s0, [[µ]]D).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of µ:
1. base case: for the run s0 it is trivial since s0 = {q0}, [[ε]]D = {ε} and ε ∈ TrD(G).
2. induction step: assume it is true for the run
% = s0
t0−−→ (s0, t0) λ0−−−→ s1 · · · −→ · · · sn tn−−→ (sn, tn) λn−−−→ sn+1 ∈ Outcome1(fD,H)
Let %′ = %
tn+1−−−−→ (sn+1, tn+1) λn+1−−−−→ sn+2 be a run in Outcome1(fD,H) and µ = PM2(tr(%)) =
λ0.λ1. · · · .λn. By definition of fD, tn+1 = fD(%) = TD(µ). Hence λn+1 ∈ TD(µ) and
sn+2 = PostG(sn+1, (Σ \ tn+1)∗.λn+1)
= PostG(PostG(s0, [[µ]]D), (Σ \ tn+1)∗.λn+1)
= PostG(s0, [[µ]]D.(Σ \ tn+1)∗.λn+1)
= PostG(s0, [[µ.λn+1]]D)
By construction of H, sn+2 6= ∅ thus PostG({q0}, [[µ.λn+1]]D) 6= ∅ and µ.λn+1 ∈ TrD(G).

Lemma 2 Let D be a dynamic projection. For all µ ∈ TrD(G), there exists a unique run % ∈
Outcome1(fD,H) such that µ = PM2(tr(%)).
Proof. We prove this by induction on the length of µ. Note that as the game H is deterministic,
and strategies prescribes one move, it suffices to prove the existence of a run. If µ = ε, then s0 is a
good candidate. Suppose that every word in TrD(G) ∩ Σn satisfies the property of the Lemma and let
µ.λ ∈ TrD(G)∩Σn+1. Since µ ∈ Σn, there exists a run % ∈ Outcome1(fD,H) such that µ = PM2(tr(%)).
Let s = last(%) and t = fD(%) = TD(µ) the (unique) action Player 1 can perform after the run %.
Then δH(s, t) = (s, t) and %
t−−→(s, t) ∈ Runs2(H). According to Lemma 1, s = PostG(s0, [[µ]]D). Since
µ.λ ∈ TrD(G), λ ∈ t and s′ = PostG(s0, [[µ.λ]]D) 6= ∅. So s′ = PostG(s, (Σ \ t)∗.λ) = δH((s, t), λ) and
%′ = % t−−→(s, t) λ−−→s′ is a run of H. Hence %′ ∈ Outcome1(fD,H) and such that PM2(tr(%′)) = µ.λ. 
Proposition 5 Let D be a dynamic projection. D is valid if and only if fD is a winning strategy for
Player 1 in H.
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Proof. Assume that D is a valid dynamic projection and let % ∈ Outcome1(fD,H) with s = last(%) and
µ = PM2(tr(%)). According to Lemma 1, s = PostG(s0, [[µ]]D). Since D is a valid dynamic projection,
s 6⊆ F , so s 6∈ Bad. This implies that fD is a winning strategy.
For the other implication, assume that D is not a valid observer. This means that there is a trace
µ ∈ TrD(G) such that PostG(s0, [[µ]]D) ⊆ F . Since µ ∈ TrD(G), then according to Lemma 2, there
exists a unique run % ∈ Runs1(H) such that PM2(tr(%)) = µ. Then, last(%) = PostG(s0, [[µ]]D) ∈ Bad, so
fD is not a winning strategy. 
Given a strategy f for Player 1 in H, for all µ ∈ Σ∗, there exists at most one %µ ∈ Outcome1(f,H) such
that PM2(tr(%µ)) = µ.
Definition 10 Let f be s strategy for Player 1 in H. We define the dynamic projection Df induced by
the dynamic observability choice Tf : Σ∗ → 2Σ given by: Tf (µ) = f(%µ) if %µ. 
Proposition 6 If f is a winning strategy for Player 1 in H, then Df is a valid dynamic observer.
Proof. Applying the construction of the Lemma 1, we obtain the strategy fDf = f . Since f is a winning
strategy, by Proposition 5, we get that Df is a valid dynamic projection. 
Notice that we only generate a representative for each of the equivalence classes induced by ∼G. However,
an immediate consequence of the two previous propositions is that there is a bijection between the set
of winning strategies of Player 1 and D∼G .
4.3 Most Permissive Dynamic Observer
We now define the notion of most permissive dynamic observers and show the existence of a most
permissive dynamic observer for a system G.
For an observer O = (X,xo,Σo, δo,Γ) and w ∈ Σ∗, recall that Γ(δo(xo, w)) is the set of events that
O chooses as observable after observing w.
Assume w = a0a1 · · · ak. Let w = Γ(xo).a1.Γ(δo(xo, a1)).a2.Γ(δo(xo, a2)) · · · ak.Γ(δo(xo, ak))) i.e., w
contains the history of what O has chosen to observe at each step and the events that occurred after
each choice.
Definition 11 Let O∗ : (2Σ.Σ)∗ → 22Σ . By definition, such a mapping O∗ is the most permissive
observer3 for ensuring that F is opaque if the following holds:
O = (X,xo,Σo, δo,Γ) is a valid observer ⇐⇒ ∀w ∈ L(G), Γ(δo(xo, w)) ∈ O∗(w)
The definition of the most permissive observer states that any valid observer O must choose a set of
observable events in O∗(w) on input w; if an observer chooses its set of observable events in O∗(w) on
input w, then it is a valid observer.
Theorem 4 The most permissive dynamic observer O∗ can be represented by a finite automaton.
Proof. As H is turn-based 2-player game under full observation, there is a most permissive winning
strategy which is state-based on H (see [23]). It is defined as follows: Let us first compute the set of
winning states of the game for player 1 It is defined as follows: Let Good = (S1 ∪ S2) \ Bad be the set
of safe states of H. To solve this 2-player game, we define the Cpre operator:
CPre(S) = {s ∈ S1 | ∃t ⊆ Σ | δH(s, t) ∈ S} ∪ {(s, t) ∈ S2 | ∀λ ∈ t | δH((s, t), λ) ∈ S}
Then by iterating Cpre and computing the fix-point Cpre∗(Good) = ∩iCprei(Good), we obtain the set of
winning states of the game for Player 1 [23], and as the set of states is finite, this computation terminates.
If the initial state of the game belongs to Cpre∗(Good), then there is a strategy for Player 1 to win.
Consider now the following finite automaton derived from H: FH = (Cpre∗(Good), s0,Σ ∪ 2Σ, δFH ),
where δFH is the restriction of δH to the states Cpre
∗(Good). Now, f is a winning strategy for Player
1 w.r.t. H and Bad if and only if for any run ρ ∈ Runs1(H), f(ρ) ∈ EnabledFH(last(ρ)), namely, every
3Strictly speaking O∗ is not an observer because it maps to sets of sets of events whereas observers map to sets of
events. Still we use this term because it is the usual terminology in the literature.
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move defined by f is a move of FH . In other words, any winning strategy in H is an instance of FH .
Now from Proposition 6, given a winning strategy, we can define a valid dynamic projection from which
we can derive a valid dynamic observer (Proposition 3). Conversely, with each valid dynamic observer D
is associated a valid dynamic projection DO (Proposition 2) and from Proposition 5, fDO is a winning
strategy which thus can be generated by FH . 
The previous theorem states that FH can be used to generate any observer. In particular, given a
state-based winning strategy, the corresponding valid observer is finite and thus its associated dynamic
projection is regular.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 4 is the following:
Corollary 1 Problem 4 is in EXPTIME.
Proof. Computing the winning states and FH on turn-based games can be done in linear time in the
size of the game. As H has size exponential in G and Σ the algorithm we provide to solve Problem 4 is
EXPTIME. 
It remains open whether Problem 4 is EXPTIME-complete.
Example 6 To illustrate this section, we consider the following small example. The system is depicted
by the automaton in Figure 5(a). The set of secret states is reduced to the state (2). Figure 5(b)
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Figure 5: Example of a game automaton
represents the associated game automaton. The states of Player 1 are represented by circles whereas the
ones of Player 2 are represented by squares. The only bad states is the state (2) (bottom right). The most
permissive strategy is obtained when Player 1 does not allow transition {a, b} to be triggered in state (1)
(otherwise, Player 2 could chose to observe either event a or b and in this case the game will evolve into
state (2) and the secret will be revealed). The dashed lines represents the transitions that are removed
from the game automaton to obtain FH . Finally, Figure 5(c) represents a possible observer O generated
from the game automaton. 
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5 Optimal Dynamic Observer
Among all the possible observers that ensure the opacity of the secret, it is worthwhile noticing that
some are better (in some sense) than other. Note that if q0 /∈ F , then there exists a trivial observer that
always erases all events of Σ that ensures the opacity of F . The attacker will observe nothing and will
thus not be able to disclose the secret. Obviously, this observer is not very interesting as the effect would
be to deny services from the standpoint of a user. In this section, we would like to define a notion of
cost of for observers which captures this intuitive notion.
We first introduce a general cost function and we show how to compute the cost of a given pair (G,O)
where G is a system and O a finite state observer. Second, we show that among all the valid observers
(that ensure opacity), there is an optimal cost, and we can compute an observer which ensures this cost.
The problems in this section and the solutions are closely related to the results in [5] and use the same
tools: Karp algorithm [13] and a result of Zwick and Paterson [24].
5.1 Cost of an observer
We want to define a notion of cost which takes into account the set of events the observer chooses to
hide and also how long it hides them. We assume we are given a system G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ) and a finite
observer O = (X,x0,Σ, δo,Γ).
With each set of observable events Σ′ ∈ 2Σ, we associate a cost of hiding Σ \ Σ′ which is a positive
integer. We denote Cost : 2Σ → N this function. Now, if the observer O is in state x, the current cost
per time unit is Cost(Γ(x)). Examples of such cost mapping are given in the sequel. A measure of the
cost incured by an observer O on a sequence of events w produced by G is just the average of the cost
of hiding events.
Definition 12 (Cost of a run) Let Runsn(G) the set of runs of length n in Runs(G). Given a run
ρ = q0
a1−−−→ q1 · · · qn−1 an−−−→ qn ∈ Runsn(G), let xi = δo(x0, wi) with wi = tr(ρ[i]). The cost associated
with ρ ∈ Runsn(G) is defined by:
Cost(ρ,G,O) = 1
n+ 1
·
n∑
i=0
Cost(Γ(xi)).

Notice that the time basis we take is the number of steps which occurred in G. Thus if the observer is
in state x, and chooses to observe Γ(x) at steps i and i+ 1 in a run of G, Cost(Γ(x)) will be counted at
steps i and i+ 1. The definition of the cost of a run corresponds to the average cost per time unit, the
time unit being the number of steps of the run in G.
Definition 13 (Cost of an observer) Define the cost of the set of runs of length n that belongs to
Runsn(G) by
Cost(n,G,O) = max{Cost(ρ,G,O) | ρ ∈ Runsn(G)} (4)
and the cost of an observer with respect to a system G is
Cost(G,O) = lim sup
n→∞
Cost(n,G,O) (5)
(the limit may not exist whereas the limit sup is always defined.) 
Here are examples for the cost mapping Cost on 2Σ:
• Suppose that we have a function c : Σ → N that associates with each a ∈ Σ the cost c(a)
corresponding to the penalty if this event is hidden. Hiding Σ′ ⊆ 2Σ costs the sum of the cost
of the hidden events. Hence Cost(Γ(x)) =
∑
a∈Σ\Γ(x) c(a) and we can set Cost(Σ) to a particular
value.
• Assume Σ = {a, b} and c(a) = c(b) = 2; hiding a and b at the same time costs more than hiding a
alone or b alone. This can be captured by Cost(∅) = 7 and Cost({a}) = 2 and Cost({b}) = 2.
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Remark 5 Alternatively, one can define the cost of a run as follows: Given a run ρ = q0
a1−−−→
q1 · · · qn−1 an−−−→ qn ∈ Runsn(G), let xi = δo(x0, wi) with wi = tr(ρ[i]). The cost of ρ ∈ Runsn(G)
is defined by:
Cost2(ρ,G,O) = 1
n+ 1
·
n∑
i=0
{
c(ai) if ai /∈ L(δo(x0, wi))
0 otherwise .
Compared with Cost(ρ,G,O), we only take into account the costs of the events that are filtered by the
observer when they actually occur in the run ρ. Further, the cost of an observer is given by Definition 13.
5.2 Computing the cost of a Dynamic Observer
We show that we can compute the cost of a given finite state observer O for a finite state system G.
We reduce the problem of computing this cost to computing the maximum mean-weight in a weighted
graph.
5.2.1 Weighted Automata & Karp’s Algorithm
Before introducing the optimal dynamic observer and opacity synthesis problem, we present a set of
tools that we are going to use in that process. These deal with the notion of cost in a model of dynamic
behaviors such as a finite automaton model. The notion of cost for automata has already been defined
and algorithms to compute some optimal values related to this model are described in many papers. For
our purposes, the model of weighted automata is appropriate. We recall here this model and the results
of [13] which will be used later.
Definition 14 (Weighted Automaton) A weighted automaton is a pair (A,w) s.t. A = (Q, q0,Σ, δ)
is a finite automaton and w : Q→ N associates a weight with each state. 
Definition 15 (Mean Cost) Let ρ = q0
a1−→ q1 a2−→ · · · an−−→ qn be a run of A. The mean cost of ρ is
µ(ρ) =
1
n+ 1
×
n∑
i=0
w(qi) .

We remind that the length of ρ = q0
a1−→ q1 a2−→ · · · an−−→ qn is |ρ| = n. We assume that each run of length
n of A can be extended to a run of length n+1. Let Runsn(A) be the set of runs of length n in Runs(A).
The maximum mean-weight of the runs of length n for A is ν(A,n) = max{µ(ρ) for ρ ∈ Runsn(A)}. The
maximum mean weight of A is ν(A) = lim supn→∞ ν(A,n). Actually the value ν(A) can be computed
using Karp’s maximum mean-weight cycle algorithm [13] on weighted graphs. If c = q0
a1−→ q1 a2−→
· · · an−−→ qn is a cycle of A i.e., q0 = qn, the mean weight of the cycle c is µ(c) = 1n+1 ·
∑n
i=0 w(qi).
The maximum mean-weight cycle of A is the value ν∗(A) = max{µ(c) for c a cycle of A}. As stated
in [24], for weighted automata, the mean-weight cycle value is the value that determines the mean-
weight value (the transient behaviors of the system are not contributing to this value). It follows that
ν(A) = lim supn→∞ ν(A,n) = limn→∞ ν(A,n) = ν∗(A).
The original Karp’s maximum mean cycle algorithm [13] works for weighted automaton where the
weights are on the edges. We give the version where weights are on vertices. Let ν∗ = maxc µ(c) where c
ranges over all cycles in A. A cycle c with µ(c) = ν∗ is a maximum mean-weight cycle. Let D(q) be the
weight of a most expensive path from q0 to q and Dk(q) be the weight of a most expensive path which
has exactly k edges (if there is no such path Dk(v) = −∞). Assume |Q| = n. Karp’s algorithm is based
on the fact that
ν∗ = max
q∈Q
min
0≤k≤n−1
Dn(q)−Dk(q)
n− k
The values Dk(q) can be computed iteratively:
D0(q0) = w(q0) (6)
D0(q) = −∞ for q 6= q0 (7)
Dk+1(q) = max
q∈δ(q′,a)
{Dk(q′) + w(q)} (8)
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Thus for each state q we can compute min(q) = min0≤k≤n−1
Dn(q)−Dk(q)
n−k and then compute the value
maxq∈Qmin(q) to obtain ν∗. This algorithm runs in O(n.m) where |Q| = n and |δ| = m (where |δ|
denotes the number of transitions in δ). Improvements [7] can be made to this algorithm still the worst
case run-time is O(n.m).
5.2.2 Algorithm
We assume that G generates runs of arbitrary length for simplicity. We use the automaton G⊗O defined
in Section 4.1.3. Remind that G⊗O = (Q×X, (qo, x0),Σ∪{τ}, δ, F ×X). We define the weight function
for G⊗O as: w(q, x) = Cost(Γ(x)). Thus G = (G⊗O, w) is a weighted automaton.
By Definition 12 and Definition 15, and the results related to the Karp’s maximum mean cycle algorithm
described in Section 5.2.1, it is easy to see that:
Theorem 5 Cost(G,O) = ν∗(G).
Using Karps’s algorithm it follows that:
Theorem 6 Computing Cost(G,O) is in PTIME.
Proof. The size of G⊗O is clearly polynomial in the size of G and O. 
Example 7 To illustrate the construction of the weighted automaton, let us consider the system G and
the observer O2 of example 6. Assume that c(a) = c(b) = 2 and c(c) = 0. The automaton is given in
Figure 6. The weight function is pictured near each state. The values Dk(v) and min(v) for each state
1, x1
w((1, x1)) = 2
2, x2
w((2, x2)) = 0
1, x2
2, x1
w((2, x1)) = 2
w((1, x2)) = 0
a
a
b
a
bττ
a
Figure 6: G = (G⊗O2, w)
v are given in Table 1. The maximum mean-weight value ν∗(G) is the maximum value maxvmin(v) for
every state v of G×O. We thus obtain Cost(G,O) = 2 
1, x1 2, x2 1, x2 2, x1
D0 2 −∞ −∞ −∞
D1 −∞ 2 −∞ 4
D2 6 −∞ 4 −∞
D3 −∞ 6 −∞ 8
D4 10 −∞ 8 −∞
min 2 −∞ 2 −∞
with

Dk+1(1, x1) = Dk(2, x1) + 2
Dk+1(2, x2) = max{Dk(1, x1), Dk(1, x2)}
Dk+1(1, x2) = max{Dk(2, x2), Dk(2, x1)
Dk+1(2, x1) = Dk(1, x1) + 2
Table 1: Iterations for G⊗O.
5.3 Optimal Dynamic Observer
We now turn our attention to a more difficult decision problem:
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Problem 5 (Bounded Cost Observer)
Inputs: an automaton G = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ) and an integer k ∈ N.
Problem:
(A) Is there an observer O ∈ OBS s.t. F is opaque w.r.t. G and O and Cost(G,O) ≤ k ?
(B) If the answer to (A) is “yes”, compute a witness observer O s.t. Cost(G,O) ≤ k.
To solve this problem we use a result By Zwick and Paterson [24], which is an extension of Karp’s
algorithm for finite state games.
5.3.1 Zwick and Paterson’s Algorithm
Definition 16 (Weighted Graph) A weighted directed graph is a pair (G,w) s.t. G = (V,E) is a
directed graph and w : E → {−W, · · · , 0, · · · ,W} assigns an integral weight to each edge of G with
W ∈ N. We assume that each vertex v ∈ V is reachable from a unique source vertex v0 and has at least
one outgoing transition. 
Definition 17 (Weighted Graph Game) A weighted graph game G = (V,E) is a bipartite weighted
graph with V = V1 ∪V2 and E = E1 ∪E2, E1 ⊆ V1×V2 and E2 ⊆ V2×V1. We assume the initial vertex
v0 of G belongs to V1. 
Vertices Vi are Player i’s vertices. A weighted graph game is a turn based game in which the turn
alternates between Player 1 and Player 2. The game starts at a vertex v0 ∈ V1. Player 1 chooses an
edge e1 = (v0, v1) and then Player 2 chooses an edge e2 = (v1, v2) and so on and they build an infinite
sequence of edges. Player 2 wants to maximise lim infn→∞ 1n ·
∑n
i=1 w(ei) and Player 1 wants to minimize
lim supn→∞
1
n ·
∑n
i=1 w(ei).
One of the result of [24] is that there is a rational value ν ∈ Q s.t. Player 2 has a strategy to ensure
lim infn→∞ 1n ·
∑n
i=1 w(ei) ≥ ν and Player 1 has a strategy to ensure that lim supn→∞ 1n ·
∑n
i=1 w(ei) ≤ ν.
ν is called the value of the game.
Let n = |V |. To compute ν, proceed as follows [24]:
1. Let ν0(v) = 0 for v ∈ V . For v ∈ V and k ≥ 1, νk(v) is defined by:
νk(v) =
{
min(v,w)∈E{w(v, w) + νk−1(w)} if v ∈ V1
max(v,w)∈E{w(v, w) + νk−1(w)} if v ∈ V2
This is the equivalent of the Dk(v) values for Karp’s algorithm using a min max strategy depending
on which player is playing;
2. for each v ∈ V , compute ν′(v) = νk(v)/k for k = 4 · n3 ·W .
3. for each vertex, the value of the game from v is the only rational number with a denominator at
most n that lies in the interval ]ν′(v)− α, ν′(v) + α[ with α = 12n(n−1) .
The value of the game is ν = ν(v0) where v0 is the initial vertex. To compute an optimal strategy for
Player 1, proceed as follows:
1. compute the values ν(v) for each v ∈ V ;
2. if all the vertices of V1 have outgoing degree 1, there is a unique strategy and it is positional and
optimal;
3. otherwise, take a vertex v ∈ V1 with outgoing degree d ≥ 2. Remove dd2e edges from v leaving
at least one. Recompute the value mv for each v. If mv = ν(v), there is an optimal positional
strategy which uses the remaining edges from v. Otherwise there is a positional strategy that uses
one of the removed edges.
We can iterate the previous scheme to find an optimal strategy for Player 1. In summary some of the
results by Zwick and Paterson [24] we are going to use are:
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• there is a value ν ∈ Q, called the value of the game s.t. Player 2 has a strategy to ensure that
lim infn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1 w(ei) ≥ ν and Player 1 has a strategy to ensure that lim supn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1 w(ei) ≤
ν; this value can be computed in O(|V |3 × |E| ×W ) where W is the range of the weight function
(assuming the weights are in the interval [−W..W ]). Note that deciding whether this value satisfies
ν ./ c for ./∈ {=, <,>} for c ∈ Q can be done in O(|V |2 × |E| ×W ).
• there are optimal memoryless strategies for both players that can be computed in O(|V |4 × |E| ×
log(|E|/|V |)×W ).
5.3.2 Synthesis of an Optimal Observer
To solve the Problem 5, we use the most permissive strategy FH we computed in Section 4.2. Given G
and FH , we build a weighted graph game WG(G,FH) s.t. the value of the game is the optimal cost for
the set of all observers. Moreover an optimal observer can be obtained by taking an optimal memoryless
strategy in WG(G,FH).
To build WG(G,FH) we first make FH complete. This is to enable FH to synchronize with G even
if the event chosen by G from the current state is not among the one that FH has chosen to observe. Let
(x, L) be a state of FH with L the set of events we have chosen to observe. For each event λ ∈ Σ \L, we
add a transition to a new state x(L), and from x(L) a transition to (x, L) with the choice of observable
events L: this is as if we can observe λ but we keep the same choice of observable events when λ occurs.
Doing this, we obtain the complete most permissive strategy F ′H . We do this in order to take into
account the current choice of the observer at each step taken by G which is the time basis.
Each transition of F ′H is assigned a cost: if it is a transition labeled by λ ∈ Σ, the weight is zero; if
it is labeled by Σ′ ⊆ Σ, the weight is Cost(Σ′). In the product G × F ′H , either G and F ′H make a joint
synchronized transition (Σ) or only F ′H makes a transition (labeled in 2Σ). We can assign a weight to
a transition of G × F ′H by taking the weight of the transition taken by F ′H . This way we obtain the
weighted automaton WG(G,FH).
Using Zwick and Paterson’s algorithm on WG(G,FH), we can solve the following problem:
Problem 6 (Optimal Cost Observer)
Inputs: an automaton G, a secret F .
Problem: Compute the least r ∈ Q s.t. there is a valid observer O s.t. F is opaque
w.r.t. (G,O) and Cost(G,O) ≤ r.
By construction of WG(G,FH) we have:
Theorem 7 Let ν be the value of the game WG(G,FH). Then r = 2 · ν.
Proof. By construction ofWG(G,FH), one time unit of G is simulated by 2 steps ofWG(G,FH). Hence
the result. 
Corollary 2 Problem 5 and 6 can be solved in O(2|G|).
Proof. Checking whether c ≤ 2 · ν can be done in O(|V |2 × |E| ×W ) if the game has |V | vertices, |E|
edges and the maximal constant is W . Computing ν can be done in O(|V |3 × |E| ×W ). Using our
construction, WG(G,FH) has at most |Q| · (2|Q| + (2|Q| · 2|Σ|)) vertices. Computing the strategies can
also be done in polynomial time in the size of the game. 
Example 8 Coming back to Example 6, we first need to complete the game automaton depicted in
Figure5(c). This leads to the new automaton F ′H given in (Figure 7). Further, we need to make the
product between G and F ′H and to attach to each transition of the game automaton its weight (we here
assume that c(a) = c(b)). The result is depicted in Figure 8.
Using Zwick and Paterson’s algorithm we obtain that ν = c(a) is 2 and the most permissive weight
strategy is obtained by removing the dashed transitions in the game of Figure 8. This leads to two different
observer O1 and O2 presented in Figure 9(a) and (b).
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Figure 7: F ′H
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Figure 8: The weighted game automaton
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Figure 9: The two optimal observers
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6 Conclusion
In this article, we have investigated the synthesis of opaque system when the observability of events can
change over time. In the context of static observers, where the observability of events is fixed a priori,
we provided an algorithm (PSPACE-complete) to compute a maximal subalphabet of observable actions
ensuring opacity. Then, we considered the case where the observability of events can be adapted during
system’s execution. We defined a model of dynamic observers determining whether an event is observable
after a given observed trace. We formulated the notion of valid observer for an observer ensuring opacity
and we proved that verifying the validity of a finite state observer is PSPACE-complete. We provided
a method to compute the set of all valid observers by computing the set of winning strategies in a
turn-based safety two-player game and demonstrated in that case that the set of all valid observers can
be finitely represented. We have shown that the previous problem can be solved in exponential time.
EXPTIME-completeness is left open.
In this article, we assumed that the dynamic observers can change the set observable events only after
an observable event has occurred. This assumption should fit most applications since the knowledge of
the attacker also depends on observed traces. It would be interesting to investigate also the case where
this decision depends on the word executed by the system. The case where the observability depends on
the state of the system should also be considered. Finally, the notion of semantics of an observed trace
used throughout this article is based on the assumption that attacker can react, i.e. acquire knowledge,
faster that system’s evolution. It would be interesting to adapt this work to other notion of semantic,
i.e. for other indistinguishably relation over system’s execution.
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